We present systems of logic programming agents (LPAS) to model the interactions between decision-makers while evolving to a conclusion. Such a system consists of a number of agents connected by means of unidirectional communication channels. Agents communicate with each other by passing answer sets obtained by updating the information received from connected agents with their own private information. As an application, we show how extensive games with perfect information can be conveniently represented as logic programming agent systems, where each agent embodies the reasoning of a game player, such that the equilibria of the game correspond with the semantics agreed upon by the agents in the LPAS.
Introduction
In this paper we present a formalism for systems of logic programming agents. Such systems are useful for modeling decision-problems, not just the solutions of the problem at hand but also the evolution of the beliefs of and the interactions between the agents.
A system of logic programming agents consists of a set of agents connected by means of unidirectional communication channels. Each agent contains an ordered choice logic program [3] representing her personal information and reasoning skills. Agents use information received from their incoming channels as input for their reasoning, where received information may be overridden by other concerns represented in their program. The resulting model is communicated to the agents listening on the outgoing channels. The semantics of the whole system corresponds to a stable situation where no agent needs to change its output.
To model a single agent's reasoning, we use ordered choice logic programs [3] , an extension of logic programming which provides facilities for the direct representation of preference between rules and dynamic choice between alternatives.
Game theory [5] makes contributions to many different fields. In particular, there is a natural connection with multi-agent systems. In this paper we illustrate the use of logic programming agent systems as convenient executable representations of games, where each player corresponds with exactly one agent. We concentrate on so-called extensive games with perfect information: a sequential communication structure of players taking decisions, based on full knowledge of the past. We demonstrate that such games have a constructive and intuitive translation to logic programming agent systems where the agents/players are connected in a cyclic communication structure. The game's equilibria (Nash or subgame perfect, depending on the transformation used to construct the corresponding system) can then be retrieved as the system's answer set semantics. Moreover, the fixpoint computation of the answer sets closely mirrors the actual reasoning of the players in reaching a conclusion corresponding to an equilibrium.
Choice Logic Programming
Choice logic programs [1] represent decisions by interpreting the head of a rule as an exclusive choice between alternatives.
Formally, a Choice Logic Program [1] , CLP for short, is a finite set of rules of the form where and are finite sets of ground atoms. Intuitively, atoms in are assumed to be xor'ed together while is read as a conjunction (note that may be empty, i.e. constraints are allowed). The set is called the head of the rule Ö, denoted À Ö , while is its body, denoted Ö . In examples, we often use "¨" to denote exclusive or, while " " is used to denote conjunction.
The Herbrand base of a CLP È , denoted È , is the set of all atoms that appear È . An interpretation is a consistent [1] .
The following example is a variation on the well-known prisoner's dilemma [5] . For two components ½ ¾ ¾ , ½ ¾ implies that ¾ contains more general, or less preferred, information than ½ . Throughout the examples, we will often represent an OCLP È by means of a directed acyclic graph in which the nodes represent the components and the arcs the -relation.
¿ A relation on a set is a strict partial order iff is anti-reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive. is pointed if there is an element ¾ such that for all ¾ Ò .
We assume that all rules are grounded; i.e. any rule containing variables has been replaced with all its ground instances.
In fact, the same rule could appear in two components and thus È should be a set of labeled rules. We prefer to work with the present simpler notation and note that all results remain valid in the general case. When it is clear from the context that only total interpretations are considered, we will omit the negative part. If necessary it can be retrieved by means of the positive complement.
A decision involves a choice between several alternatives. In a CLP, decisions are generated by so-called choice rules, i.e. rules with multiple head atoms. Thus, for an interpretation Á of a CLP, and are alternatives if they appear together in the head of an applicable rule. For an ordered program, we will use a similar notion which takes the preference order into account. Intuitively, for a component , and are alternatives w.r.t. an interpretation Á if there is an applicable choice rule containing and in the head, in a component that is at least as preferred as . Atoms that are each others' alternative w.r.t. a certain interpretation Á will continue to be so in any extension Â Á . In this sense, ª È is a monotonic operator.
Definition 2 Let
Although rules do not contain negations, they can still conflict. E.g. one rule could force a choice between and while other rules could force and separately. More generally, a conflict exists for a rule Ö, which is applicable w.r.t. an interpretation Á , if for all ¾ À Ö , there exists another rule Ö such that À Ö ª Á ´Öµ´ µ.
As in [4] , we use the preference relation among the components to ignore rules that are defeated by more preferred rules forcing different alternatives. The above definition defines a approach where a rule can be defeated by applied rules that are not less preferred as the rule at hand. This approach can be seen as credulous, as a random choice is made between two equally or unrelated alternatives. A more skeptical approach would demand that the rules are related and the defeater(s) is (are) strictly more preferred. 
Definition 3 Let Á be an interpretation for an OCLP
È . A rule Ö ¾ È is defeated w.r.t. Á iff ¾ À Ö ¡ Ö ¼ ¾ È ¡ ´Öµ ´Ö ¼ µ Ö ¼ is applied w.r.t. Á À Ö ¼ ª Á ´Öµ´ µ
Example 4 Reconsider the interpretations

Logic Programming Agents
In this section we consider systems of communicating agents where each agent is represented by an OCLP that contains its knowledge about itself and other agents.
Agents communicate via unidirectional communication channels through which the conclusions derived by the agent at the source of the channel are passed on to the agents at the other end. We will use a more convenient graph-like notation in our examples. Figure 2 .
Example 7 Two witnesses discover a body lying in the park. The first witness tells the local police that she saw hair near the victim and that she did not see any blood.
The Herbrand base of a LPAS is the union of all the Herbrand bases of the ordered choice logic programs used by the agents. An interpretation assigns a set of literals to each agent in the system. These literals may be concluded by the agent itself, based on input received through an input channel, or they may simply be accepted from other agents via an input channel. Thus, an agent sends its full set of beliefs over all outgoing communication channels. On the other hand, an agent receives as input, the beliefs of all agents connected to its incoming channels. If two agents send conflicting information to a receiving agent, the conflicts are removed. An agent reasons on the basis of positive information that is received from other agents (its input) and its own program that may be used to draw further conclusions, possibly overriding incoming information. Hence, agents attach a higher preference to their own rules rather than to suggestions coming from outside.
This can be conveniently modeled by extending an agent's ordered program with an extra "top" component containing the information gathered from its colleagues. This way, the OCLP semantics will automatically allow for defeat of incoming information that does not fit an agent's own program. For an interpretation to be a model, it suffices that each agent produces a local model (output) that is consistent with its input. To avoid such self-sustaining propagation of assumptions, we will demand that a model be the result of a fixpoint procedure which mimics the evolution of the belief set of the agents over time. Thus, in an evolution, the agents evolve as more information becomes available: at each phase of the evolution, an agent updates her program to reflect input from the last phase and computes a new set of beliefs. An evolution thus corresponds to the way decision-makers try to get a feeling about the other participants. The process of reaching a fixpoint boils down to trying to get an answer to the question "if I do this, how would the other agents react", while trying to establish a stable compromise. Note that the notion of evolution is nondeterministic since an agent may have several local models. For a fixpoint, it suffices that each agent can maintain the same set of beliefs as in the previous stage.
Definition 8 Let be a LPAS. An interpretation
Definition 9 Let be a LPAS. A sequence of interpretations
Example 11 Consider the Werewolf LPAS of Example 7. The interpretation Á described in Example 8 is an answer set of the LPAS. The vampire-zombie LPAS of Example 10 has one answer set Á , where
Á´ Ð ½ µ Á´ Ð ¾ µ ÞÓÑ Ú ÑÔ Ö Û Ð Ò
Theorem 1 Let be a LPAS. An interpretation Á is a model for iff it is an evolutionary fixpoint of .
Corollary 1 Let be a LPAS. Every answer set of is a (model of .
The reverse of the above corollary does not hold in general. A counter example is given in Example 10. However, for acyclic LPAS a one-to-one mapping does exist.
Theorem 2 Let be a LPAS without cycles. An interpretation Å is a stable model (resp. answer set) iff Á is a model (resp. c-model) of .
LPAS and Game Theory
In this section we demonstrate that extensive games with perfect information have a natural formalization as logic programming agent systems. The equilibria of such games can be obtained as the answers sets of the system, where each agent represents a player, and the evolution mimics the mechanism players can use in order to come to a decision.
Extensive Games with Perfect Information
An extensive game is a detailed description of a sequential structure representing the decision problems encountered by agents (called players) in strategic decision making (agents are capable to reason about their actions in a rational manner). The agents in the game are perfectly informed of all events that previously occurred. Thus, they can decide upon their action(s) using information about the actions which have already taken place. This is done by means of passing histories of previous actions to the deciding agents. Terminal histories are obtained when all the agents/players have made their decision(s). Players have a preference for certain outcomes over others. Often, preferences are indirectly modeled using the concept of payoff where players are assumed to prefer outcomes where they receive a higher payoff. Summarizing, an extensive game with perfect information, [5] ), is 4-tuple, denoted AE À È ´ µ ¾AE , containing the players AE of the game, the histories À , a player function È telling who's turn it is after a certain history and a preference relation for each player over the set of terminal histories. For examples, we use a more convenient representation: a tree. The small circle at the top represents the initial history. Each path starting at the top represents a history. The terminal histories are the paths ending in the leafs. The numbers next to nodes represent the players while the labels of the arcs represent an action. The numbers below the terminal histories are payoffs representing the players' preferences (The first number is the payoff of the first player, the second number is the payoff of the second player, ...). Figure 4 models an individuals' predicament in A strategy of a player in an extensive game is a plan that specifies the actions chosen by the player for every history after which it is her turn to move. A strategy profile contains a strategy for each player. The first solution concept for an extensive game with perfect information ignores the sequential structure of the game; it treats the strategies as choices that are made once and for all before the actual game starts. A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally improve upon his choice. Put in another way, given the other players' strategies, the strategy stated for the player is the best this player can do .
Example 12 The game depicted in
¨À À À À À 1 ÙÝ Ö Ö ¼ ¼µ Ö À À À À À 2 ×ØÖ Û ÖÖ × ÖÖ × Ö Ö ¾ ½µ Ö À À À À 1 Ö Ñ ÒÓ Ö Ñ Ö ¿ ¿µ Ö ½ ½µ
Example 13 The game of Example 12 has two Nash equilibria:
ÙÝ Ö Ñ ×ØÖ Û ÖÖ × and ÙÝ ÒÓ Ö Ñ ÖÖ × Although the Nash equilibria for an extensive game with perfect information are intuitive, they have, in some situations, undesirable properties due to not exploiting the sequential structure of the game. These undesirable properties are illustrated by the next example. Figure 5 . This game has three Nash equilibria ÒÓ Ô Ø Ø , ÒÓ Ô Ø ×Ô Ö and Ô Ø Ø . The strategy profile ÒÓ Ô Ø ×Ô Ö is an unintuitive Nash equilibrium since it is sustained by the threat that the child would opt for the spider when a pet was allowed. However, the child would never go for a spider (payoff 1) since a cat is more playful (payoff 2).
Note that the strategies of the other players are not actually known to , as the choice of strategy has been made before the play starts. As stated before, no advantage is drawn from the sequential structure.
Because players are informed about the previous actions they only need to reason about actions taken in the future. This philosophy is represented by subgames. A subgame is created by pruning the tree in the upwards direction. So, intuitively, a subgame represent a stage in the decision making process where irrelevant and already known information is removed. Instead of just demanding that the strategy profile is optimal at the beginning of the game, we require that for a subgame perfect equilibrium the strategy is optimal after every history. In other words, for every subgame, the strategy profile, restricted to this subgame, needs to be a Nash equilibrium. This can be interpreted as if the players revise their strategy after every choice made by them or another player. Therefor, subgame perfect equilibria eliminate Nash equilibria in which the players' threats are not credible. ÙÝ Ö Ñ ×ØÖ Û ÖÖ × .
Playing Games
We demonstrate that extensive games with perfect information have a natural formu- lation as multi-agent systems with a particularly simple information-flow structure between the agents. For our mapping, we assume that an action can only appear once . This is not really a restriction, since one can simply use different names for these actions since they are not related. This will just have an effect on the syntax of the game and not on its semantics. Figure 6 . This game has six Nash equilibria: , Three of these Nash equilibria are also subgame perfect equilibria:
Example 16 Consider the extensive game depicted in
The following transformations will be used to retrieve the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria from the game as the answer sets of the corresponding OCLP. Intuitively an agents is created for each player in the game. The OCLP of such an agents contains as many component as the represented player has payoffs (step 1.). The order among the components follows the expected payoff, higher payoffs correspond to more specific components (step 2). The various actions a player can choose from a certain stage of the game are turned into a choice rule which is placed in the most specific component of the agent modelling the player making the decision (step 3). Since Nash equilibria do not take into account the sequential structure of the game, players have to decide upon their strategy before starting the game, leaving them, for each decision, to reason about both past and future. This is reflected in the rules (step 4): each non-choice rule is made out of a terminal history (path from top to bottom in the tree) where the head represents the action taken by the player/agent, when considering the past and future created by the other players according to this history. The component of the rule corresponds to the payoff the deciding player would receive in case the history was actually followed. When considering subgame perfect equilibria, we know that they do take previous actions into account, making unnecessary to reason about the past. This is reflected in step 4'. Steps 5 and 6 establish the communication between the agents in the system.
Definition 10 Let
Example 17 For the game of Example 16, the corresponding LPAS's Ë
Ò and Ë × are displayed in Figure 7 .
We use ℄ to denote the set of actions appearing in a sequence .
Figure 7 The LPAS's of Example 17
Notice that the answer sets for Ë Ò match exactly the Nash equilibria of the game, while the subgame perfect equilibria can be retrieved using the answer sets of Ë × . 
Theorem 3 Let
Ë × ).
For the proof of the above theorem, we demonstrate that every c-evolutionary fixpoint of Á can be constructed in Ò iterations, with Ò the number of players in the game. Of course, this only happens when players or agents know which actions will lead to an equilibrium state. In practice, it might take more iterations in order to find a fixpoint. Such a fixpoint computation can easily be seen as the players trying to obtain actions belonging to an equilibrium state. At first, she picks an action and sees how the other players respond to this. With this information she can update her actions. This process is carried on until a equilibrium is reached.
Relationship to Other Approaches
In this section we investigate the relationship of our approach with other formalisms. We restrict to the relationship with Game Theory, logic and agents. For a comparison with other preference based systems we refer to [2] .
In the previous section we have demonstrated that OCLPs and multi-agent systems based on OCLPs provide a way to represent extensive games with perfect information in such a way that, depending on the transformation, either the Nash or subgame perfect equilibria can be retrieved as the stable models of the system. With the algorithm for the stable model computation of an OCLP, we immediately have an implementation for the equilibria of the game that the OCLP is representing. At the end of the previous section we already mentioned certain extensions to our proposed formalism in order to investigate other topics relevant to game theory, like for example information hiding and cheating. Probably the most important benefit for using logic programming for such research is its immediate return in the form of algorithms which allow for an efficient monitoring tool for the effects of the changes made. Another aspect of logic programming that we already mentioned in the introduction, is its capability to represent more complex games. Take the Travel OCLP (Example 2) for example. If we just consider the first three components (È ½ , È ¾ and È ¿ ), we see the representation of a very simple strategic or extensive game with a single player (the person who wants to travel). In this case the equilibrium would be ËÔ Ò which corresponds to the situation in which there are few dealers. From the moment that the dealers outnumber the officers two alternatives instead of just one are needed, which is impossible in game theory.
There are two main ways of relating logic and games: logic games and game logics. The former uses the games for the purpose of logic, while the latter uses logic for the purpose of game theory. Detailed information about their history can be found in [8] . Our research belongs the category of game logic and, as far as we know, we are the only ones that look at game theory in the context of logic programming. The only exception might be [6] , but he simply puts game theoretic features on top of his language. We, on the other hand, do not go outside the realm of logic programming to retrieve equilibria.
Some research has already been done in the area of agents and games, although with different viewpoints. For example, [7] investigates methods to prevent agents exploiting game theoretic properties of negotiations. [6] incorporates the players of the game directly into its logic programming formalism for strategic games in order to obtain mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We, on the other hand, are interested in multiagent systems that are able to represent, in an intuitive way, games such that agents correspond with players and models with the equilibria.
